Crowded Career Ladders? Intra-firm Spillovers of Raised Retirement Age (PhD Job Market Paper)
Abstract: I study how delayed retirements reshape firms' internal labor markets, leveraging a German reform that raised women's early retirement age by at least three years. The reform increased retention of older women and reduced both internal promotions and external hiring of younger coworkers, with the greatest losses among middle-aged workers who were near to older workers on the career ladder. Spillovers are structured: promotion crowd-outs arise in thick internal labor markets with intense competition, while hiring declines are largest in thin external markets with high turnover costs. Crowd-out effects concentrate within jobcells, whereas coworkers in different jobcells can benefit when retained older workers possess specific human capital. Taken together, the evidence supports slot-constraint theories-augmented by firm-specific human-capital mechanisms.
CERGE-EI WP No. 810 [November 2025, final PhD JMP version];
IAB-DP 01|2026 [January 2026, same in content as CERGE-EI WP]
Awards: Young Economist of the Year in the Czech Republic (Czech Economic Society, 2024), 2nd place
(for preliminary JMP version from November 2024)
Young Economists Seminar (Croatian National Bank, 2024), 1st place
(for the June 2024 version that also included parts of the paper "Retirement Age Reforms and Worker Substitutability: Implications for Employment of Older Workers.")
Media highlight: Roklen 24 prize highlights (in Czech); IAB (In German); Talking Economics Podcast (08:07-15:30); CERGE-EI Blog; Charles University online magazine