Abstract: I study how delayed retirements reshape firms' internal labor markets, leveraging a German reform that raised women's early retirement age by at least three years. The reform increased retention of older women and reduced both internal promotions and external hiring of younger coworkers, with the greatest losses among middle-aged workers who were near to older workers on the career ladder. Spillovers are structured: promotion crowd-outs arise in thick internal labor markets with intense competition, while hiring declines are largest in thin external markets with high turnover costs. Crowd-out effects concentrate within jobcells, whereas coworkers in different jobcells can benefit when retained older workers possess specific human capital. Taken together, the evidence supports slot-constraint theories-augmented by firm-specific human-capital mechanisms.
Presentations: GLO-BONN-2026 (scheduled); BeNA Labor Economics Workshop; CRC Retreat Spring; University of Bonn, IHS, NHH (all 2026), WZB Workshop on the Economics of Ageing and Pensions, RFBerlin Workshop on the Economics of Aging, IAB NU-DE Workshop on Applied Microeconomics, EEA Congress, International Conference on Pension, Insurance and Savings, IZA/Leiden/OECD Workshop on Recent Advances in Labor Economics Using Linked Employer-Employee Data, HUN REN, and ifo Institute (all 2025); EALE (2024, 2023); EWMES, IAB-DiskAB, ESPE, IZA Summer School, Dutch National Bank, and Young Economists Seminar by Dubrovnik Economic Conference (all 2024); SITES and the U Chicago Student Workshop (all 2023); AIEL (2023, 2022); CERGE-EI Brown Bag (2023); BSE Summer School, Czech Economic Society, Armenian Economic Association, CERGE-EI Microeconometrics Reading Group, DW (all 2022), and DPW (2020).
Collections: Socialpolitik-aktuell "Retirement at 67";
IAB "Working in Later Life";
New Economics Papers on Economics of Ageing
1st chapter in my Ph.D. dissertation "Essays in Personnel Economics: Aging Workforce and Worker Substitutability"